Paradoxes of Democracy and Depoliticisation in the Social Peripheries of Modernity by Preite, Gianpasquale
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PACO, ISSN: 2035-6609 - Copyright © 2017 - University of Salento, SIBA: http://siba-ese.unisalento.it 
 
 
 
PArtecipazione e COnflitto 
* The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco 
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version)    
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version) 
PACO, Issue 10(3) 2017: 874-895 
     DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v10i3p874 
 
Published in November 15, 2017 
Work licensed under a Creative Commons At-
tribution-Non commercial-Share alike 3.0 
Italian License  
RESEARCH ARTICLE 
 
PARADOXES OF DEMOCRACY AND DEPOLITICISATION 
IN THE SOCIAL PERIPHERIES OF MODERNITY  
 
Gianpasquale Preite  
University of Salento, Italy 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: At the end of the 20th Century, the global diffusion of economic neoliberalism represents, 
seen from diverse perspectives, the outcome of a communicative overlapping between the economic 
system and the political system. This overlapping is equivalent to a functional intrasparency, which gen-
erates paradoxes of democracy as the depoliticisation and exclusion phenomena when facing inclusion 
expectations, as occurs in the peripheries of the world. Depoliticisation, in fact, appears as a paradox of 
democratic systems closely related to the development of the technocratic practices and the enhance-
ment of the bureaucratic apparatus. One of the characteristics of technocracy is that it lies on the as-
sumption that great decisions are of technical nature, not political. If great decisions may be taken by 
means of technical instruments, it means that there is no longer need for ‘professional politicians’, and 
even less need for people’s participation. Technocracy and burocracy converge above the traditional 
sphere reserved to politics. The consequence of this convergence is, in fact, depoliticisation. In other 
words, there is a relation between technocracy, burocracy and ideological crises. Hence, the more tech-
nical the decision-making process, the more burocratized will the process of power be, and the more de-
ideologized will the process of fundamental choices be. Populist movements thus describe the effect of 
the attempt of providing responses to the issues of modern society, to the extent in which the economic 
value becomes the only discriminating variable between what is correct and what is wrong (what is eco-
nomically pointless must be discarded) and it actually move the decisional process away from the political 
sphere, enhancing the differences between the center and the periphery, between inclusion and exclu-
sion.  
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In the light of such trends, which have become extensively resilient in the systems, how can the process 
of functional specification of social systems (economics, politics) be implemented in the peripheries of 
modernity? If trust in the political system lessens vis à vis problem-solving capabilities, how the conse-
quent uncertainty be absorbed?  
This essay aims to describing the extent in which the depoliticisation process can compensate for the 
pressure put on expectations against inclusion values. The theme is tackled with an outlook that stems 
from the epistemological mutation of globalization and, consequently, from the resolution of the tradi-
tionally axial center/periphery pattern, and focuses on the analysis of peripheries that come into play as 
the protagonists of the two-way relationship with their center, albeit the unusual democratic participa-
tion, yet to be interpreted. 
 
KEYWORDS: depoliticisation, neoliberalism, populism, paradoxes of democracy, peripheries of moder-
nity 
 
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR: Gianpasquale Preite, e-mail: gianpasquale.preite@unisalento.it 
 
 
 
1. Neoliberalism, paradoxes of democracy and depoliticisation  
 
Liberalism is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. It is a recurrent yet historically 
variable pattern of economic and political organization in modernity. Ideologically, lib-
eralism claims that economic and political relations are best organized through free ac-
tors who seek to advance their own material or ideal interests in an institutional frame-
work that maximizes the scope for formally free choice (Jessop 2002, 458). The resur-
gence of liberalism in the form of neoliberalism is often attributed to a successful hege-
monic project voicing the interests of financial capital. Its recent hegemony in neoliberal 
regimes undoubtedly depends on the successful exercise of political leadership in re-
sponse to the crisis of Atlantic Fordism a crisis that the rise neoliberal policy has exacer-
bated. «Liberalism can be seen as a more or less spontaneous philosophy within capital-
ist societies, that is, as a seemingly natural, almost self-evident economic, political, and 
social imaginary that corresponds to specific features of bourgeois society» (Jessop 
2002, 462). 
Since the end of the seventies, neo-liberalism has thus emerged as a new hegemonic 
global paradigm. Numerous aspects have facilitated the spread of neoliberalism globally, 
but did not pay much attention to the role played by the assessment both in the legiti-
macy of state neoliberalization and in the explanation of the resistance of neoliberalism 
(Giannone 2016, 495). In a complex society, neoliberalism may be seen as the doctrinal 
economic model of the ‘free market’, an ecosystem capable of self-regulating itself and, 
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hence, in an optimal condition whereby the variables of demand, inflation, unemploy-
ment operate by means of natural forces and, with some spontaneous adjustments, they 
are capable of ensuring an equilibrium. In other words, a perfect world with full employ-
ment, creativity and ‘perpetual growth’ (Hayek 1944; Friedman 1962). 
This theorization ideologizes the economic doctrine and, in its democratic metamor-
phosis, it preserves the features of fundamentalism with which contemporary legitimi-
zation processes are constructed. Actually, if something in markets (and consequently, 
at a social level) does not work (i.e. inflation rises, growth drops, etc), the only plausible 
explanation is that the market is not sufficiently free. Hence, the solution and the way of 
creating a perfect society is enforcing stricter and more effective fundamental norms of 
economic and political freedom and eliminating every type of state interference on 
economy as a universally viable prescription for development, praxes that respond to 
the ‘invisible hand’ and Smith’s liberalism. 
Neoliberalism is the expression of a response to the ‘over-government’ that, in the 
wake of privatization, deregulation and new public management, would have been a 
state withdrawal from the direct government of many aspects left to economic freedom 
(Lastrico 2016, 360). 
As an economic project, neoliberalism calls for: liberalization and deregulation of eco-
nomic transactions, not only within national borders but also through these borders; The 
privatization of services provided by the State and the treatment of public spending on 
welfare as a cost of international production, rather than as a source of domestic de-
mand. In particular, the expansion of financial capitalism towards the ‘lower levels’ of 
economic life (Bowman et al. 2014) was facilitated by the privatization of utilities and 
the outsourcing of public services under the encouraging flag of liberalization (Salento, 
Pesare 2016, 466). 
As a political project, neoliberalism seeks to roll back normal forms of state interven-
tion associated with the mixed economy and the Keynesian welfare national state as well 
as the exceptional forms of intervention aimed at managing internationally widespread 
crises (Jessop 2002, 458-459). 
Neoliberalism is a model that often conflicts with the various forms of public interven-
tion and, consequently, with the ‘Keynesian Economic Theory’ which envisages (espe-
cially in times of crisis) the need for state intervention to increase the global demand 
even in the condition of deficit spending. This determines an increase in consumptions, 
investments and employment (Keynes 1920, 1936). 
Even the outlook founded on ‘welfare economy’ is not immune from neoliberalist op-
position. In welfare economy every time there is an actual and overall income increase, 
there is a greater collective satisfaction and every redistribution of monetary income 
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from a wealthier subject to a less wealthy one increases the community satisfaction, thus 
enabling the full achievement of the most intensive needs to the detriment of the less 
intensive ones (Pigou 1920). 
Lastly, economy considers social space in terms of market and, consequently, of ‘sup-
ply and demand’, even when it deals with issues related to social welfare, for instance, 
(community wellbeing), where the balance between social needs and the allocation of 
scarce resources become evident. A level, the latter, whereby social expectations arise 
determining the shift of decisional responsibilities, and therefore of risk, from economy 
to politics, despite economy depends of the functioning of politics, or the insurance of 
peace conditions, on guaranteeing rights and on the fact that binding decisions are pro-
duced. Nevertheless, the political coverage of specifically economic risks must not be 
confounded with forms of undifferentiated interdependence between economy and 
politics, and between economy and the state. 
The issue of what role should the state play in economy has always been the focus of 
social sciences and has produced a considerable amount of literature, albeit constantly 
aiming to counter ‘liberalism’ and ‘interventionism’.  
The Theory of Public Choice developed by Buchanan in the 70s of the past century, 
examines the ‘non-market decisions’ and analyzes the behavior of the actors on the po-
litical scene. The Public Choice synthesizes the application of economy to political sci-
ence (Mueller 1979, 1) and to political and social philosophy issues. 
The element that makes it topical in any applied economy research is that the inter-
vention of economic reality cannot disregard he political-institutional context, where the 
economic models must be put into practice. Nevertheless, also the Public Choice is in 
antithesis with the Welfare Economy and criticizes state interventions only when the 
latter is implemented according to tools, which do not sufficiently safeguard freedom 
and citizens interests (Buchanan 1989, 9-10). This theoretical approach does not see pol-
itics as a virtuous system, nor politicians as enlightened rulers with the community’s 
wellbeing at heart; on the contrary, the latter often appear as rational players led, within 
the market context, by egoistic and personal interests (i.e. prestige, wealth, power, tax 
advantages, etc.); a plausible assumption, if we take into account that all these factors 
affect economic and politics and law, they alter the fragile participation system and the 
democratic government of institutions and pave the way to conflicts, contradictions and 
new paradoxes which, alongside the globalization of the economic system, the liberali-
zation of the movement of capital, the existence of monetary and political supra-institu-
tions, raise the issue at a highly complex level. In other words, the take the debate at a 
level which brings to the surface the non-neutral contents of theoretical constructions 
at the basis of the concepts of social welfare, the protection of rights and the quality of 
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life, and give rise to paradoxes involving the representativeness of democracy in the 
terms already debated by Condorcet, in the 18th century and vividly theorized by Arrow 
in the mid-20th century (Arrow 1951). 
After the abandonment of a welfare state / Keynesian key social perspective and the 
apparent uncontrolled victory of neoliberalism, the theme of popular sovereignty has 
become a central theme in Western democracies. 
In the complexity of the globalized world, democratic life is decentralized giving rise 
to a variety of actions and institutions, which unexpectedly go beyond the concept of 
universal suffrage (Rosanvallon 2008). Here, the major issue for democracy is not the 
proclamation of rules, which are widely acknowledged by now, but rather making them 
concrete, that is, translating into reality the values of democracy and overcoming para-
doxes, starting from the constitutive ones linked to the concept of freedom and equality 
(Bobbio 1999). Bobbio maintained that one of the first paradoxes is represented by the 
growing demand for participation in decision making on issues concerning the commu-
nity –a demand which stems from the ‘direct democracy’ model which gradually replaces 
the ‘representative democracy’ model. Nevertheless, the dimension and the functions 
of a modern State have made inapplicable the direct democracy procedures and difficult 
the implementation of the representative democracy (Mancarella 1995, 136). 
In the traditional institutions of the representative democracy, the level of public con-
fidence temporally denotes a progressive decline, which is even more evident at inter-
national level. (Norris 1999; Pharr, Putnam 2000; Rosanvallon 2009; Mastropaolo 2011; 
Galli 2011, Petrucciani 2014). This is a process of reducing democratic representative-
ness, beginning in the mid-1970s of the last century, with the Report on the Crisis of 
Democracy edited by Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki for the ‘Trilateral Commission’. 
According to these authors, in fact, the overload of social demands that burdened the 
life of democracies has been met, through a process of verticalisation of decisions, 
strengthening of executives, concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of 
more restricted elites (Crozier, Huntington, Watanuki 1977). At the same time, there has 
been a gradual erosion of liberal-democratic legitimacy, both in terms of the demand for 
‘equal freedoms’ and the demand for ‘equal participation’ in decision-making processes, 
both of which are expressions of the ethical substratum of liberalism and democracy 
(Galeotti 1993, 2010). 
This phenomenon, alongside the globalization process, has contributed to the crea-
tion of yet another paradox, due to the fact that there has also been a greater burocra-
tisation, seen as power and, consequently, a ‘development in technical terms’ of society. 
A technocratic drift whereby the great decisions made by one or more States are of tech-
nical nature, and not political. If the great decisions can be taken with technical tools, 
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we would no longer need ‘professional politicians’ nor peoples’ participation while grow-
ing trust being placed in management consultants and other private sector producer ser-
vices firms than in the expertise, experience, and opinions of public sector professionals 
(Jessop 2007a). 
Technocracy and burocracy merge above the traditionally political sphere. There cer-
tainly is a strong bond between technocracy, burocracy and ideological crises, due to the 
fact that the more technical the decision making process becomes, the more red tape 
will there be in the process of power, the more de-ideologized will the process of making 
fundamental choice become. 
The last paradox of democracy derives from the contrast between the democratiza-
tion process and the massification seen as a depersonalization of the individual and a 
strong trend - a feature of the neoliberal society - to uniformize and, hence, standardize 
the values of living conditions and the behavior of the single elements of a social com-
munity, and the consequent process of cancellation of individual traits. It is a massifica-
tion that stems from the concrete extension of the bases of power, which generates 
depoliticisation due to the fact that the masses (periphery) are removed from the polit-
ical system (center). We are witnessing a democratic disenchantment whereby citizens’ 
vote less than in the past and, above all, they vote in a different way (Rosanvallon 2008). 
This process being influenced by the greatest structural inequalities present in society 
and are reflected in state policies (Fawcett, Marsh 2014, 185). 
The concept of depoliticisation is emerging as one of the most, if not the most, im-
portant devices for understanding contemporary patterns of governance throughout ad-
vanced industrial democracies. Its use has been stretched from describing a relatively 
simple form of statecraft to the widespread foreclosure of political debate and the dis-
engagement of citizens from formal political arenas. What seems clear is that depolitici-
sation appears to be a process, which is far easier to pin down empirically than concep-
tually; in that sense, «we all agree that it is happening, we’re just not entirely agreed on 
what precisely is happening» (Foster 2014, 226). 
Depoliticisation is basic concept in political analysis. For the polity, a key aspect of 
depoliticisation is the redrawing of the structural difference between the political and 
the non-political spheres. This creates space for various kinds of depoliticisation. How-
ever, as Foucault, and Gramsci emphasize, this dividing line is not natural, even if it is 
sometimes taken-for-granted: it must be policed and can be repoliticised (Jessop 2014, 
212). This space represents a ‘shadow area’, from which it was created and developed 
the new 21st-century populism c. d ‘from below’, in which disappears the logic of repre-
sentation, generating instability (Bazzicalupo 2016, 62) and threats to the fabric of de-
mocracy (Rosanvallon 2008, 128). 
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The democratic disenchantment, however, does not favor the lack of concern for pub-
lic affairs; citizens show their involvement in community life in a different way. In be-
tween elections, democratic viability takes on different features and takes on other 
forms, drawn from all the activities which do not, however, associate citizens with the 
exercise of power, but with organizing their control over who is ruling (Rosanvallon 2008, 
123) – a constant balancing act between the empowerment to act and the empower-
ment to deny, already theorized by Montesquieu, because not only consent but also 
dissent plays a major role. These activities have, at all times, an ambiguous character. 
On the one hand, in fact, they may be useful to strengthen democracy by stimulating 
positively, on the other they can also weaken it, fostering the depoliticisation processes 
that expose power to new evidence of ‘good governance’ at the service of society. 
The malaise that comes from the populism is the product of the inability to represent 
and respond to social unease that, left to itself by ‘rational’ political forces, is listened 
only by the prophets of resentment (Petrucciani, 2014). However, the gap between 
power and society, between center and periphery, does not lead to social appropriation, 
but to a situation in which citizens are increasingly expropriated from democratic pro-
cesses. The populism of the 21st century ignores complications and disagreements, even 
assimilates discontent and stops it, without creating alternatives or social mediation. 
There is no sublimation, no alienation or sacrifice of differences in the unitary identity of 
the people. There is no political project, although the wave of credulity, cynicism and 
trust in the voice of one as everyone, drag the fragile institutions (Bazzicalupo 2016, 69-
70).  
Tocqueville maintained that democracy could simplify political life, but actually, now-
adays, the contrary occurs. The development of democracy makes political life ever 
more complex. Politics, with its ordinary actions formally oriented towards a democratic 
inclusion, actually democratically excludes those who are ‘different’, and includes those 
who are ‘equal’. Observing, describing and understanding the mechanisms and struc-
tures of social inclusion and exclusion, means unveiling the possibilities of demystifying 
equalitarian demagogies and orienting the very expectations of inclusion. By means of 
these procedures, society controls the nature of the its structural operations as well as 
the evolution improbabilities is may be exposed to, ensuring its stability. 
The consequence of the stabilization of this differentiation process does no longer 
allow for inclusion into a social system to imply also the inclusion into others. The inclu-
sion of the center or of the periphery in the system of law, does not definitely translate 
into its inclusion also into the political or economic system. This fact may raise problems 
as it generates a differentiation between inclusion and exclusion and increases risk, di-
minishing interdependence (De Giorgi, Magnolo 2005, 17). 
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This is the main reason whereby a paradox occurs. 
If one assumes this perspective, one will see how in modern society there is a greater 
equality and, at the same time, a greater inequality, more legality and illegality, more 
wealth and more poverty, more knowledge and more ignorance, more democracy and 
less participation, more safety and more risks (Castañeda Sabido, Cuéllar Vàsquez 1998). 
When politics, facing these conditions, does not provide stability of expectations, but 
rather contributes to detour them, there is a concrete issue of how the consequent un-
certainty may be absorbed. 
Democracy is still seen as the type of government, which accomplishes the represen-
tation of everyone’s interests, and this is why there is a greater expectation in democ-
racy and a higher demand for it (De Giorgi 2006, 133-135). By the same token, there is 
the assertion of a globalizing idea whereby the new social order is assigned to the mar-
ket where one can assert the freedom of private individuals. The assumption is the fol-
lowing: if the selection of public decisions does not work, the natural selection in terms 
of money and finance would certainly work. The outcome of this assumption may be 
translated into depoliticisation and into the results of the current political, social and 
economic crisis, which is affecting most of the world’s population. 
 
 
2. The center/periphery differentiation process in the systems theory 
 
The center/periphery differentiation is, above all, a historiographical model applied 
also in times before modernity, as an interpretation key, along with other models, of the 
relations between empires and provinces (Sassen 1995), between cities and territories 
(Mela 2006), between what is included and what is excluded (Luhmann 1992).  
In the general theory of politics, the depoliticisation concept evokes the meaning of 
moving away from the political aspects, or the subtraction of the political influxes which 
takes place when, in the political systems, the functional codes are distracted from their 
specification and are confounded with the functional codes of economy and law, thus 
generating a central nucleus, definable as ‘center of interests’. 
Hence, the process of the releasing of the functional specification of the system is a 
factor found at the basis of the center/periphery differentiation, used to indicate the 
inclusion/exclusion processes, compared to the economic, social and territorial power 
relations. This type of differentiation shows the peripheries acquiring a more or less neg-
ative value, depending on the context examined. 
A wide range of peripheries may be examined (Caldiron 2005), from the extreme ones 
– as those in some areas of the world far from modernity (democracy, human rights, 
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individual and/or collective freedoms), where there are no legal systems nor stable po-
litical and institutional structures, where economies are weak and subject to strong var-
iations- to the less severe ones yet equally significant (on the rise in the western world) 
which report paradoxes of democracy which are independent from the lack of legal sys-
tems and democratic political structures, but depend on the disappointment of the cog-
nitive expectations which generate forms of selectivity and populist orientations that 
can be considered as depoliticisation phenomena, i.e. the 2016 Brexit issue representing 
not only the result of the votes of the elderly against the youth’s, but also the votes of 
the provinces (a periphery made up also by large urban centers in the Midlands and the 
old industrial districts as the ones in the West and East Midlands) against the metropolis 
(a center made up by the City and the other districts with mutual interests having basi-
cally an economic and financial matrix).  
The constructivist and functionalist theories and, above all, the theory of social sys-
tems, offer a valid methodological reference for the analysis of the differentiation pro-
cess at the basis of the center/periphery differentiation and, consequently, of the inclu-
sion/exclusion issue. 
The constructivist approach, in fact, leads to the assumption that modern society is 
functionally differentiated, therefore the social systems through which modernity may 
be described, are the outcome of the differentiation based on their function (Di Viggiano 
2012a, 293-295), . This means that the point of departure of the reflection is not identity 
but the differentiation between the social system and the environment, is so much as 
that every form is a form with two sides and every form is a form of some kind of differ-
entiation. 
At the basis of this analytical perspective, there is the outcome of an epistemological 
process, which ascribes centrality to the concept of observation. Observing means dif-
ferentiating and indicating. From a definition many more may be generated, thus making 
up a network of connections/differentiations as a product of the observer’s activities 
(Spencer-Brown 1969). 
Even the center/periphery difference may therefore be considered as the outcome of 
an observation which, taking on the form of a differentiation, defines the selection of 
one side against another. Every unit of the center/periphery differentiated form is a so-
cially organized abstraction (mankind) which orients expectations. This abstraction is the 
result of an external observation, which, by observing, makes up the identity of a social 
system (Esposito 2002, 125). 
In the 80s of the past century, with Luhmann’s publication of the Soziale Systeme the 
scholar introduced a concept taken from biology to explain the capability of systems of 
guiding their own reproduction processes – autopoiesis. The scope of this acquisition 
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was of great momentum as it shifted the focus of the issue from repetition, i.e. form the 
reiteration of some behaviors or expectation of behaviors, to the connection, i.e. the 
issue of deciding how to go from a given phenomenon to a subsequent one (Luhmann 
1984, 80-92). 
This phase is innovative and fundamental for two reasons. On the one hand, it repre-
sents a strategy to reduce complexity, because every system excludes the excess of com-
plexity with respect to what is absorbable, depending on their own operations. On the 
other hand, it enables to consider the structure of a system as something stable, as it is 
the result of an election with respect to all which is external. The relations between ele-
ments, in fact, acquire structural value because they represent a selection between mul-
tiplicities of possible combinations, and only this way will they recover the advantages, 
with the relevant risks, of a selective reduction (Luhmann 1984, 440). 
Luhmann’s Social Systems Theory, assumes that society is the result of the form of the 
difference between the system and the environment. It is a macro-assumption, i.e. from 
the generalization of a form, which is valid for all social systems. Every social system 
reproduces the form of the difference with respect to its environment (externally) and 
is stable to the extent in which it reproduces internally the characteristics, which are at 
the basis of its functional specification. 
This is the autopoiesis process which defines the ‘operational closure’ of the system, 
but also its opening to the environment (Luhmann, De Giorgi 1991, 30-32), whereby the 
term ‘closure’ refers only and exclusively to the lack of an input-output relation between 
system and environment, whilst the term ‘openness’ implies the capability of self-regu-
lation with respect to the disturbances deriving from the environment. 
As Jessop observes, the concept of autopoiesis elaborated by Luhmann, allows us to 
overcome the problem of hierarchy between systems (question specific to Marxist the-
ory). In particular, systems such as politics and economy, having their own codes, are 
independent in operational terms. This has both structural and strategic consequences. 
On the structural level, the systems have an operational autonomy that is absolute and 
therefore cannot determine social development. However, the operational autonomy 
reveals a constraint of material dependence of the performance of other systems that 
operate according to their own codes and programs. Faced with these constraints, the 
system builds simplified models introducing selective constraints, that is compatible 
with its own operations, and therefore such as to reflect their relevance with respect to 
its own reproduction. On a strategic level, modern societies are so highly differentiated 
and polycentric that no single system could ever coordinate their different interactions, 
and ensure their harmonious cooperation towards a common goal. Once the systems 
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reach the autopoietic take-off, they only respond to the problems in their own way. Ex-
ternal requests indicated in other codes and/or in terms of noise of ‘world of daily life’, 
will be considered irrelevant or, otherwise, treated as irritation to be avoided or over-
come in any way whatsoever the disturbed system deems appropriate (Jessop 2008). In 
other words, the first major implication which systems from the functional differentia-
tion of society, therefore, is that every social system is operationally independent, i.e. it 
operates selectively absorbing the information from the environment relevant for the 
system, and produces communication according to its own codes. 
The second implication is that the system may come in contact with its environment, 
and consequently with other systems, only by means of structural couplings, which take 
place in presence of highly generalized phenomena. This assumption highlights the ca-
pabilities of evolution of the system, but also selectivity with respect to its specification, 
considering that every system will absorb a new complexity only in accordance with its 
own functional coees. 
Structural coupling describes the type of interaction that takes place between two 
systems or between system and environment, without altering the identity of the sys-
tems involved. Through recurring interactions, structurally coupled systems adapt each 
other's structure. In this way, a system can integrate disturbances from the other system 
into its own processes. The structural coupling, in this sense, would be equivalent to a 
concept that Jessop proposes to experiment as a substitute for the terms ‘derivation’ or 
‘correspondence’ (Jessop 2007a). 
In the political system, the operational closure represents the meter of its stability, in 
spite of the fact that the system is always exposed to demands coming from the sur-
rounding environment, that become relevant only if there is a high generalization. At 
this point self-referentialism comes into the picture, absorbing innovations by means of 
the production of new political decisions - made according to their own functional code. 
Such new political decisions may still be adopted, without altering the structural and 
operational features of the system. Hence, these will not depend on the production of 
legal norms (belonging to the legal system) or on the variations of the supply and de-
mand of a given market (as operations which take place in the economic system). 
Another feature of the political system is the fact that its means of communicating is 
represented by ‘power’, as the very political behavior is focused on the criterion of max-
imizing power, which defines differences in decisions made to meet the needs. In a hy-
pothesis of a perfect rationale of its behavior, it will take into account also other sub-
systems and their specific communicative universe, only if these are functional to power. 
However, this consideration opens the space for further exploration. As noted by Jes-
sop, it is not be neglected the strong dependence of the State from law and money to 
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ensure its collectively binding decisions, which implies a close connection between the 
systems of politics, economy and law (Jessop 2007b), even if each of these systems sees 
this coupling from its own distinctive point of view. 
Economy uses ‘money’ as a communicative tool. The monetary mechanism is the one 
that contributes the most to economy’s differentiation process (Marinelli 1993, 125). 
From a material standpoint, money takes on the role of a ‘meter of value’ and supports 
‘exchange mechanisms’ which follow the supply and demand laws.  
The law, in turn, albeit its relational interface which connects rationally to the codes 
of each of these systems and with all the others making up its environment, orients itself 
according to the meaning and the inner structures of the legal system proper (Luhmann 
1990, 61-62).  
In fact, the systems theory analysis describes the function of law as a structure of ex-
pectations consistently generalized. Having assumed this higher level of abstraction, it 
describes how social communication is practiced and determines the selectivity of the 
legal structure.  
The legal system, thanks to its peculiar configuration, made up by all the social com-
munications that are expressed with reference to law, examines behaviors in compliance 
with the law, but also of those that violate it. Modern society is not made up in a corpo-
rate way and cannot be reduced, as none of its primary partial systems, to a unit of an 
organization. Hence, the system of law does not end with its organizations (Luhmann 
1990, 63). This remark explains how the constitution, within political power, of a juris-
diction that takes on a collectively binding decisional character, is only one of the as-
sumptions for the differentiation of the legal system, and not the only one. 
The propagation of the neoliberal thinking at a global level produces distorted effects 
on the social systems and promotes, above all, forms of undifferentiated dependence 
between economy, politics and law. 
While economy portrays a greater capability of absorbing the global dynamics accord-
ing to the inclusion-exclusion code, politics display a certain resistance mainly due to the 
impermeability, which comes from the intensive institutionalization process, which, in 
time, has defined the functional prerogatives. It is a dimension in which political choices, 
conditioned by the market, acquire the character of necessity and unavoidability. 
This consideration makes evident a property of the environment, that is ‘functional 
intransparency’, understood as the difficulty of a given system (such as, for example, the 
system of politics that is functionally specified according to its own code: power), to pro-
vide a complete description of itself, such as to be in contemporaneity both functional 
specification and environment with respect to which it has distinguished itself (Luhmann 
1997, 3). Spencer Brown speaks in this sense of the form of the distinction to highlight 
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that nothing can be indicated and observed if it is not distinguished from an undifferen-
tiated space (Spencer Brown 1969). The specification of systems, however, if on the one 
hand it breaks the linear cause-effect relations - therefore the order of operations as 
successions - on the other hand, it works through the continuous re-entry into the sys-
tem of the distinction between system/environment and this self-reference reproduces 
intransparency, therefore environments where the phenomena of depoliticisation are 
generated. 
 
 
3. The effects of globalization in the peripheries of modernity: 
inclusion networks 
 
The creation of local specificities highlights a sort of contradiction compared to the 
effects expected by the functional differentiation of society. In fact, while in the centers 
it is possible to observe a complete separation of the functions (economy of law, the 
morale of politics, etc.), in the peripheries, this differentiation cannot be traced with dis-
tinct lines, hence, the shape of modernity has a hard time in establishing itself.  
In the different peripheral realities, there may be differentiated structures, as well as 
undifferentiated ones. In both cases, the process of reproducing the elements making 
up contemporary society is not blocked. The functional differentiation is still taking place 
by means of infinite variants that reproduce, simultaneously, homologation and devi-
ance, with a mutation pace that may definitely be considered as unprecedented. 
In the temporal evolution, the center/periphery spatial axis is associated to different 
interpretation categories referring to the diverse fields of knowledge, which range from 
history to social sciences. 
At the end of the 19th Century, for example, the interpretation of the center/periph-
ery relation developed within the framework of the studies on the birth of the social 
state and was affected by the Eurocentric conception of the time (Shennan 1974), and 
by the centrality attributed to Europe and all the western word, of detecting and defining 
reference models through which ‘other worlds’ could be examined and understood. 
After one century, the center/periphery relation appears profoundly changed and 
subject to strong criticism, that has considerably impacted its progressive weakening. In 
fact, the ‘peripheries’ have taken on a major role in relation to their ‘centers’. This pro-
cess has started to become manifest at the time when from a world of states and nations 
the world became global with a spatial conception, that has focused on a social dimen-
sion. 
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This is when the model theoretised by Wallerstein took form, involving social sciences 
(anthropology, religion, economics, political decisions, urban planning, evolution of 
rights, social and individual expectations, etc.) and developed around the idea of ‘world 
system’, as a historic reflection on the global economy (Di Viggiano 2012a, 296). This is 
a proposal focusing on the rejection of the concept of ‘third world’ and on the conviction 
of the existence of one single world regulated by complex economic relations (world 
economy), in which the dichotomy ‘capital-work’ and the hoarding of an increasing 
amount of capital, explain the existing boundaries. Despite the dishomogeneity of the 
world’s capitalistic system in terms of culture, politics and economics, this proposal of-
fers a representation of the gradual process of expansion of the system proper, as a sin-
gle network or a global economic exchange system, still existing today.  
Unlike the positive modernization theories, Wallerstein does not conceive such differ-
ences as residues or irregularities that can be overcome only with the global evolution 
of the system, proving there is an inadequate knowledge of the systemic dynamics and, 
especially, of the evolutionary processes of social systems (Wallerstein 1979, 146-161). 
A major element of the ‘world system’ is the composition of the world in center, semi-
periphery and periphery. What characterizes this description of the world is a fundamen-
tal and institutionalized division between the center and the periphery. The center has 
the connotation of the high level of technological development and by products of com-
plex nature, while the periphery plays the role of providing raw materials, agricultural 
products and low-cost labor. From an economic standpoint, the periphery sells products 
at a low cost to the center and purchases from the center at comparatively higher prices. 
This constitutional inequity tends to stabilize itself producing deterministic constraints. 
Between the center and the periphery –not localized in a stable manner in specific geo-
graphic areas, there is an area called semi-periphery that behaves as a periphery in rela-
tion to the center and as a center in relation to the periphery. The semi-peripheral states 
enjoy a certain instability and can move either towards the center or towards the pe-
riphery, this becoming a ‘hinge’ which makes the global movements of the ‘world sys-
tem’ dynamic. With this theoretical and ideological matrix, the axis of the class struggle 
theorized by Marx shifts from the national level to the level of the world economy sys-
tem, attracting the interest of anti-globalization movements (Lafay 1996). 
With the establishment of modern society described as a functionally differentiated 
system, the center-periphery differentiation is above all declined by the counterposi-
tioning of globalization and regionalization processes that are not alternative one to the 
other but, rather, simultaneous and complementary, not describable using the catego-
ries of exploitation. The functional specification of societal systems detects systems ac-
cording to their function and not according to hierarchies. Every functional system is 
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necessary to society as any other function. Globalization, seen as a modern society phe-
nomenon, concerns all social systems and is not limited to one alone.  
This is a phenomenon that generates processes of institutional change in individual 
countries and strong dependence on an international level; the capacity of markets to 
overturn institutional rules and control possibilities; high economic instability rather 
than solidity of economic performance, politically supported and guaranteed; pursuit of 
cyclical rather than structural policies and, consequently, the primacy of short-term 
profit maximization (of economic actors) rather than long-term efficiency of public ac-
tion (of institutional actors) (Moini 2012, 96). 
Globalization, therefore, favors different degrees of economic development rather 
than different ways of development in different countries. On the other hand, the same 
model of capitalist accumulation is an expression of changing, variegated and spatially 
differentiated declinations, with respect to which the search for differential traits of 
common constitutive characteristics seems difficult, considering that the same mecha-
nisms of coordination, and therefore governance, tend to be heterogeneous even within 
a single State (Hollingsworth, Boyer 1997). This difficulty limits the possibility of grasping 
the differentiations with respect to which capitalism declines, although capitalist varia-
tion is understood as a more explicit conception of diversity, recognizing the strong and 
complex interdependencies present in global capitalist structuring and contingent insti-
tutional convergence between different so-called varieties of capitalism (Nixon 2014) 
and it is the basis of the theoretical model of ‘variegated capitalism’, as an explanation 
of the unequal development of capitalism through the combination of «neomarxist con-
cepts of combined and uneven development, regulationist treatments of the geogra-
phies of accumulation and regulation, and polanyan notions of socio-institutional em-
beddedness» (Peck, Theodore 2007, 762). 
The original analysis of the Luhmann’s social systems theory, presents the idea ac-
cording to which in peripheries communication survives by making a strong reference to 
people, included in knowledge networks and relations of many kinds, which are distin-
guished by the degree of social prestige and visibility they manage to obtain (Luhmann 
1999, 123; Corsi, De Giorgi 1999, 29). 
In the traditional (stratified) society, family, heritage, and ownership represent the old 
order on which the structure of society is constructed. The stratification is based on the 
unity of family and heritage and includes the patron/client relation which has also polit-
ical functions, due to the lack of a local administration that can be regulated by the cen-
ter (Eisenstandt, Roniger 1984). This order disappears with the passage to a functionally 
differentiated society where the role of associations, parties, public administrations de-
velop, as well as those of institutions organized to meet the needs of citizens according 
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to specific functions. The functioning of these structures makes unnecessary the pa-
tron/client relations as well as family, friendship, business and private proximity net-
works. 
The problem of peripheries of modernity stems from the fact that such structures. 
nowadays unheard in a structurally differentiated society- resurface due to the negative 
depoliticisation process which moves away from politics, law and, consequently, from 
the ‘center of interests’ legitimizing the quest for ‘help-nets’, for support or the expec-
tation of gratitude. 
Inside these nets one learns how to take advantage of a position of prestige in the 
organization with the causal links oriented towards sedimentation and reorganization of 
differences, with special reference to the factors, which have always led to the obtain-
ment of something (Baraldi, Corsi, Esposito 2002, 168-170). Inside such networks, the 
conditions of social inclusion take place, clearly far from the center.  
The dynamics of inclusion/exclusion become more complex due also to the cognitive 
expectation, which is generated following a deception. Deception is the event through 
which possible forms of selectivity become possible, thus generating not only new forms 
of populism but more new ‘inclusion networks’ as international terrorism (at a macro 
level) and the enhancement of ‘trust networks’, as criminal organizations (at a local 
level), whose stability derives from the legitimization of the inclusion processes which 
normalize the hypertrophy of the political system that, in different terms, fuel the depo-
liticisation process.  
Inclusion networks grant security because they generate their own legality, structure 
expectations and channel them. All peripheries of modernity can be described through 
the functioning of such network: the effectiveness of their organizational action, the 
generation of their own legality, the orientation of skills, responsibilities, safety and so-
cial costs. 
These are the elements, which make alternatives to such networks unavailable and 
define stability and specification as inclusion networks. In order to trust an organization 
one needs to know an influential person. The request of a favor triggers the recognition 
of a competence, influence, power and good will, the network rewards and motivates 
because it ‘honors’ (Luhmann 1999, 114-118). 
Family relations and the ones between patron and client survive within this context, 
but it would also make sense to start talking about corruption. This rationale highlights 
the limitations of rationality of power (means/purpose) which, as a social system, is dif-
ferent from the environment as it becomes ‘irritated’ by the antagonisms of the envi-
ronment and includes forms of irritation (Luhmann 1985, 115-132). 
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Actually, such ‘incorporation’ processes conducted by power, determine the occur-
rence of new forms of antagonism, i.e. new forms of power (Gozzi 1982, 7) which, in the 
case of peripheries of modernity, is seen as an inclusion or exclusion network. This 
means that social systems are differentiated and are not differentiated, their codes func-
tion properly and are corrupt, at the same time. 
In the periphery of modernity it is very difficult, if not impossible, to keep politics 
within the boundaries of politics, economics within the boundaries of economics and law 
within the boundaries of law. 
A sort of ‘class of corruption’ is produced, thus inhibiting a clear differentiation of 
communication. In such an instance, if we wish to impose our own right, it would be 
necessary to have an excellent political connection, or enough money to convince offic-
ers and employees. If we were to preserve our heritage it would be expedient to be 
supported by the powerful, creating the bases for the so-called ‘inclusion networks’ 
which replace the functional differentiation and enable a form of participation in com-
munication which, for some social groups, would be complex to achieve in other ways. 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Hence, in the peripheries of modernity, the social and individual expectations are 
structured so that their function of facilitating the construction of the future needs to be 
filtered by networks, which generate the immunization that, in the context of econom-
ics, both politics and law are incapable of implementing. This occurs because peripheries 
are, at a time, place for society and places where the codes for the functioning of the 
social systems are corrupt. Consequently, the protection of rights depends on institu-
tions, institutions depend on public administration, the functioning of public administra-
tion is subject to politics, and politics is conditioned by economy and, in summary, polit-
ical consensus or economically acquired. 
At such conditions, extra-institutional mass organizations (anti-politics) as the populist 
organizations are (and have in common) the result of the stabilization of the corruption 
processes of functional codes. Hence, once stabilized, the issue is no longer underdevel-
opment or backwardness, nor the lack of political or legal culture but, rather, the re-
sistance and stratification. 
The fact that one’s expectations are directed towards organizations that act as inclu-
sion networks, as a guarantee for the obtainment of what through politics could not be 
obtained, at such conditions, the expectations directed towards politics become a rea-
son for exclusion as the rime for the social actions are impossible to accept, and they 
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imply a further ‘distance’ for those who have already moved away and imply a further 
marginalization of those people who have already been marginalized. 
Observing the dynamics through which these expectations occur and take shape, gives 
the possibility of describing how peripheries are stabilized due to the fact that they are 
generated. 
The peripheries of modernity, therefore, follow a process of stabilization that derives 
from the disappointment of expectations on the part of the political system. The same 
‘Third Way’ proposed by Giddens in the nineties of the last century, as a combination to 
ensure efficiency and equity in systems, did not represent the overcoming of a paradigm 
able to act on the processes of inclusion/exclusion. The same consideration can also be 
applied to the most updated version proposed by Stiglitz according to which, the states 
of the West, and in particular the European Union, suffer from an intolerable democratic 
deficit. National governments must be subject to the diktats decided by men, women 
and commissions who are answerable only to themselves and not to the governed. Fur-
thermore, the austerity regime propagated and administered as a law imposed by the 
market economy, creates serious problems for the real economy by favoring poverty, 
inequality and a lack of democracy. 
If there is a core challenge that remains for the literature on depoliticisation today it 
is surely to identify better, to describe in more detail and to explain more effectively the 
disparate and complex motivations of political elites as they continue to design and build 
institutions that prevent us from seeing clearly the political choices that govern our os-
tensibly democratic societies (Hay 2014, 310). However, the path theorized by Stiglitz 
(continental keynism) opens a glimpse into the future because it promotes the construc-
tion of new social institutions starting with movements against the deregulation of the 
labor market, opposition to the destruction of the public university, mutual aid, the con-
struction of productive initiatives not marked by the logic of profit and ecological requal-
ification of the territory (Stiglitz 2007). 
In the meantime, something new has happened. This is the technological revolution 
that with its pervasiveness has acted as an accelerator of social and economic changes 
that are not compared with any other type of revolution, that act in an unprecedented 
way on the processes of functional specification of modern economic and political sys-
tems and that, in the periphery of modernity, stratify as spaces of integration between 
people and operate on the basis of a goal code that produces resistance to forms of 
differentiation, i. e. exclusion with respect to the functioning of different system codes. 
Among the many variants of the forms of public intervention and the many variants 
of the forms of liberalism there is the need for an overall rethinking of the relationship 
between state and market, between politics and law in the light also of the profound 
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changes induced by the technological revolution and the phenomena of de-politicization 
in progress. 
Rethinking the relation between the state and the market, between economy and 
politics, in the light of the ongoing depoliticisation phenomena, means asking new ques-
tions that overcome the old (consolidated) paradigms. Yet, it also means looking towards 
new development models capable of intervening on territorial unbalances, on the de-
pletion of social capital and infrastructural endowments, on the deskilling of educational 
systems and welfare facilities, as well as the impact on environmental issues or, more in 
general, the ones involving common goods. In other words, revisit the role of economy 
and politics, where center and periphery make up two sides of the same coin, means 
acting on the reduction of the level of deceived expectations and, consequently, acting 
on the depoliticisation process, redesigning inclusion strategies in terms of new oppor-
tunities and new forms of integration and democratic participation in the market and in 
social life, to stabilize expectations and absorb uncertainty, despite the only possibility 
of binding the future is always a risk. 
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